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Abstract
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers)
which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such
setups, we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver)
have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the
transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or
Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. We show that there
can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg and Nash
assumptions, and derive the conditions under which an informative equilibrium exists for the Stackelberg and
Nash setups. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always
informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium
values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium
behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.
Index terms— Signal detection, hypothesis testing, signaling games, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium,
subjective priors.
1 INTRODUCTION
In many decentralized and networked control problems, decision makers have either misaligned criteria or have
subjective priors, which necessitates solution concepts from game theory. For example, detecting attacks, anomalies,
and malicious behavior with regard to security in networked control systems can be analyzed under a game theoretic
perspective, see e.g., [2–13].
In this paper, we consider signaling games that refer to a class of two-player games of incomplete information
in which an informed decision maker (transmitter or encoder) transmits information to another decision maker
∗This research was supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada. Part of this
work [1] was presented at the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2018).
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(receiver or decoder) in the hypothesis testing context. In the following, we first provide the preliminaries and
introduce the problems considered in the paper, and present the related literature briefly.
1.1 Notation
We denote random variables with capital letters, e.g., Y , whereas possible realizations are shown by lower-case
letters, e.g., y. The absolute value of scalar y is denoted by |y|. The vectors are denoted by bold-faced letters,
e.g., y. For vector y, yT denotes the transpose and ‖y‖ denotes the Euclidean (L2) norm. 1{D} represents the
indicator function of an event D, ⊕ stands for the exclusive-or operator, Q denotes the standard Q-function; i.e.,
Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
exp{− t22 }dt, and the sign of x is defined as
sgn(x) =


−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
.
1.2 Preliminaries
Consider a binary hypothesis-testing problem:
H0 : Y = S0 +N ,
H1 : Y = S1 +N ,
(1)
where Y is the observation (measurement) that belongs to the observation set Γ = R, S0 and S1 denote the
deterministic signals under hypothesis H0 and hypothesis H1, respectively, and N represents Gaussian noise; i.e.,
N ∼ N (0, σ2). In the Bayesian setup, it is assumed that the prior probabilities of H0 and H1 are available, which
are denoted by π0 and π1, respectively, with π0 + π1 = 1.
In the conventional Bayesian framework, the aim of the receiver is to design the optimal decision rule (detector)
based on Y in order to minimize the Bayes risk, which is defined as [14]
r(δ) = π0R0(δ) + π1R1(δ) , (2)
where δ is the decision rule, and Ri(·) is the conditional risk of the decision rule when hypothesis Hi is true for
i ∈ {0, 1}. In general, a decision rule corresponds to a partition of the observation set Γ into two subsets Γ0 and
Γ1, and the decision becomes Hi if the observation y belongs to Γi, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
The conditional risks in (2) can be calculated as
Ri(δ) = C0iP0i + C1iP1i , (3)
for i ∈ {0, 1}, where Cji ≥ 0 is the cost of deciding for Hj when Hi is true, and Pji = Pr(y ∈ Γj |Hi) represents the
conditional probability of deciding for Hj given that Hi is true, where i, j ∈ {0, 1} [14].
It is well-known that the optimal decision rule δ which minimizes the Bayes risk is the following test, known as
the likelihood ratio test (LRT):
δ :
{
π1(C01 − C11)p1(y)
H1
R
H0
π0(C10 − C00)p0(y) , (4)
where pi(y) represents the probability density function (PDF) of Y under Hi for i ∈ {0, 1} [14].
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If the transmitter and the receiver have the same objective function specified by (2) and (3), then the signals
can be designed to minimize the Bayes risk corresponding to the decision rule in (4). This leads to a conventional
formulation which has been studied intensely in the literature [14, 15].
On the other hand, it may be the case that the transmitter and the receiver can have non-aligned Bayes risks.
In particular, the transmitter and the receiver may have different objective functions or priors: Let Ctji and C
r
ji
represent the costs from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver, respectively, where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Also
let πti and π
r
i for i ∈ {0, 1} denote the priors from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver, respectively,
with πj0 + π
j
1 = 1, where j ∈ {t, r}. Here, from transmitter’s and receiver’s perspectives, the priors are assumed
to be mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other; i.e., πti = 0 ⇒ πri = 0 and πri = 0 ⇒ πti = 0 for
i ∈ {0, 1}. This condition assures that the impossibility of any hypothesis holds for both the transmitter and the
receiver simultaneously. The aim of the transmitter is to perform the optimal design of signals S = {S0, S1} to
minimize his Bayes risk; whereas, the aim of the receiver is to determine the optimal decision rule δ over all possible
decision rules ∆ to minimize his Bayes risk.
The Bayes risks are defined as follows for the transmitter and the receiver:
rj(S, δ) = πj0(Cj00P00 + Cj10P10) + πj1(Cj01P01 + Cj11P11) , (5)
for j ∈ {t, r}. Here, the transmitter performs the optimal signal design problem under the power constraint below:
S , {S = {S0, S1} : |S0|2 ≤ P0 , |S1|2 ≤ P1} ,
where P0 and P1 denote the power limits [14, p. 62].
Although the transmitter and the receiver act sequentially in the game as described above, how and when the
decisions are made and the nature of the commitments to the announced policies significantly affect the analysis of
the equilibrium structure. Here, two different types of equilibria are investigated:
1. Nash equilibrium: the transmitter and the receiver make simultaneous decisions.
2. Stackelberg equilibrium : the transmitter and the receiver make sequential decisions where the transmitter is
the leader and the receiver is the follower.
In this paper, the terms Nash game and the simultaneous-move game will be used interchangeably, and similarly,
the Stackelberg game and the leader-follower game will be used interchangeably.
In the simultaneous-move game, the transmitter and the receiver announce their policies at the same time, and
a pair of policies (S∗, δ∗) is said to be a Nash equilibrium [16] if
rt(S∗, δ∗) ≤ rt(S, δ∗) ∀S ∈ S ,
rr(S∗, δ∗) ≤ rr(S∗, δ) ∀ δ ∈ ∆ . (6)
As noted from the definition in (6), under the Nash equilibrium, each individual player chooses an optimal strategy
given the strategies chosen by the other player.
However, in the leader-follower game, the leader (transmitter) commits to and announces his optimal policy
before the follower (receiver) does, the follower observes what the leader is committed to before choosing and
announcing his optimal policy, and a pair of policies (S∗, δ∗S∗) is said to be a Stackelberg equilibrium [16] if
rt(S∗, δ∗S∗) ≤ rt(S, δ∗S) ∀S ∈ S ,
where δ∗S satisfies
rr(S, δ∗S) ≤ rr(S, δS) ∀ δS ∈ ∆ .
(7)
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As observed from the definition in (7), the receiver takes his optimal action δ∗S after observing the policy of the
transmitter S. Further, in the Stackelberg game, the leader cannot backtrack on his commitment, but he has a
leadership role since he can manipulate the follower by anticipating the actions of the follower.
If an equilibrium is achieved when S∗ is non-informative (e.g., S0 = S1) and δ∗ uses only the priors (since the
received message is useless), then we call such an equilibrium a non-informative (babbling) equilibrium [17, Theorem
1].
1.3 Two Motivating Setups
We present two different scenarios that fit into the binary signaling context discussed here and revisit these setups
throughout the paper1.
1.3.1 Subjective Priors
In almost all practical applications, there is some mismatch between the true and an assumed probabilistic sys-
tem/data model, which results in performance degradation. This performance loss due to the presence of mismatch
has been studied extensively in various setups (see e.g., [18], [19], [20] and references therein). In this paper, we have
a further salient aspect due to decentralization, where the transmitter and the receiver have a mismatch. We note
that in decentralized decision making, there have been a number of studies on the presence of a mismatch in the
priors of decision makers [21–23]. In such setups, even when the objective functions to be optimized are identical,
the presence of subjective priors alters the formulation from a team problem to a game problem (see [24, Section
12.2.3] for a comprehensive literature review on subjective priors also from a statistical decision making perspective).
With this motivation, we will consider a setup where the transmitter and the receiver have different priors on
the hypotheses H0 and H1, and the costs of the transmitter and the receiver are identical. In particular, from
transmitter’s perspective, the priors are πt0 and π
t
1, whereas the priors are π
r
0 and π
r
1 from receiver’s perspective,
and Cji = C
t
ji = C
r
ji for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. We will investigate equilibrium solutions for this setup throughout the paper.
1.3.2 Biased Transmitter Cost2
A further application will be for a setup where the transmitter and the receiver have misaligned objective functions.
Consider a binary signaling game in which the transmitter encodes a random binary signal x = i as Hi by choosing
the corresponding signal level Si for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the receiver decodes the received signal y as u = δ(y). Let the
priors from the perspectives of the transmitter and the receiver be the same; i.e., πi = π
t
i = π
r
i for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the
Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver be defined as rt(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u⊕b)}] and rr(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u)}],
respectively, where b is a random variable with a Bernoulli distribution; i.e., α , Pr(b = 0) = 1 − Pr(b = 1), and α
can be translated as the probability that the Bayes risks (objective functions) of the transmitter and the receiver
are aligned. Then, the following relations can be observed:
rt(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u⊕b)}] = α(π0P10 + π1P01) + (1− α)(π0P00 + π1P11)
⇒ Ct01 = Ct10 = α and Ct00 = Ct11 = 1− α ,
rr(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u)}] = π0P10 + π1P01
1Besides the setups discussed here (and the throughout the paper), the deception game can also be modeled as follows. In the
deception game, the transmitter aims to fool the receiver by sending deceiving messages, and this goal can be realized by adjusting the
transmitter costs as Ct00 > C
t
10 and C
t
11 > C
t
01; i.e, the transmitter is penalized if the receiver correctly decides the original message.
Similar to the standard communication setups, the goal of the receiver is to truly identify the hypothesis; i.e., Cr00 < C
r
10 and C
r
11 < C
r
01.
2Here, the cost refers to the objective function (Bayes risk), not the cost of a particular decision, Cji. Note that, throughout the
manuscript, the cost refers to Cji except when it is used in the phrase Biased Transmitter Cost.
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⇒ Cr01 = Cr10 = 1 and Cr00 = Cr11 = 0 .
Note that, in the formulation above, the misalignment between the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the
receiver is due to the presence of the bias term b (i.e., the discrepancy between the Bayes risks of the transmitter
and the receiver) in the Bayes risk of the transmitter. This can be viewed as an analogous setup to what was
studied in a seminal work due to Crawford and Sobel [17], who obtained the striking result that such a bias term in
the objective function of the transmitter may have a drastic effect on the equilibrium characteristics; in particular,
under regularity conditions, all equilibrium policies under a Nash formulation involve information hiding; for some
extensions under quadratic criteria please see [25] and [26].
1.4 Related Literature
In game theory, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are drastically different concepts. Both equilibrium concepts find
applications depending on the assumptions on the leader, that is, the transmitter, in view of the commitment
conditions. Stackelberg games are commonly used to model attacker-defender scenarios in security domains [27]. In
many frameworks, the defender (leader) acts first by committing to a strategy, and the attacker (follower) chooses
how and where to attack after observing defender’s choice. However, in some situations, security measures may
not be observable for the attacker; therefore, a simultaneous-move game is preferred to model such situations;
i.e., the Nash equilibrium analysis is needed [28]. These two concepts may have equilibria that are quite distinct:
As discussed in [25, 29], in the Nash equilibrium case, building on [17], equilibrium properties possess different
characteristics as compared to team problems; whereas for the Stackelberg case, the leader agent is restricted to be
committed to his announced policy, which leads to similarities with team problem setups [26, 30]. However, in the
context of binary signaling, we will see that the distinction is not as sharp as it is in the case of quadratic signaling
games [25, 29].
Standard binary hypothesis testing has been extensively studied over several decades under different setups
[14, 15], which can also be viewed as a decentralized control/team problem involving a transmitter and a receiver
who wish to minimize a common objective function. However, there exist many scenarios in which the analysis
falls within the scope of game theory; either because the goals of the decision makers are misaligned, or because
the probabilistic model of the system is not common knowledge among the decision makers.
A game theoretic perspective can be utilized for hypothesis testing problem for a variety of setups. For example,
detecting attacks, anomalies, and malicious behavior in network security can be analyzed under the game theoretic
perspective [2–6]. In this direction, the hypothesis testing and the game theory approaches can be utilized together
to investigate attacker-defender type applications [7–13], multimedia source identification problems [31], inspection
games [32–34], and deception games [35]. In [8], a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game between Byzantine
(compromised) nodes and the fusion center (FC) is investigated. The strategy of the FC is to set the local sensor
thresholds that are utilized in the likelihood-ratio tests, whereas the strategy of Byzantines is to choose their flipping
probability of the bit to be transmitted. In [9], a zero-sum game of a binary hypothesis testing problem is considered
over finite alphabets. The attacker has control over the channel, and the randomized decision strategy is assumed
for the defender. The dominant strategies in Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian setups are investigated under the Nash
assumption. The authors of [33,34] investigate both Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of a zero-sum inspection game
where an inspector (environmental agency) verifies, with the help of randomly sampled measurements, whether the
amount of pollutant released by the inspectee (management of an industrial plant) is higher than the permitted
ones. The inspector chooses a false alarm probability α, and determines his optimal strategy over the set of all
statistical tests with false alarm probability α to minimize the non-detection probability. On the other side, the
inspectee chooses the signal levels (violation strategies) to maximize the non-detection probability. [10] considers a
complete-information zero-sum game between a centralized detection network and a jammer equipped with multiple
antennas and investigates pure strategy Nash equilibria for this game. The fusion center (FC) chooses the optimal
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threshold of a single-threshold rule in order to minimize his error probability based on the observations coming
from multiple sensors, whereas the jammer disrupts the channel in order to maximize FC’s error probability under
instantaneous power constraints. However, unlike the setups described above, in this work, we assume an additive
Gaussian noise channel, and in the game setup, a Bayesian hypothesis testing setup is considered in which the
transmitter chooses signal levels to be transmitted and the receiver determines the optimal decision rule. Both
players aim to minimize their individual Bayes risks, which leads to a nonzero-sum game. [35] investigates the
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) solution of a cyber-deception game in which the strategically deceptive
interaction between the deceivee (privately-informed player, sender) and the deceiver (uninformed player, receiver)
are modeled by a signaling game framework. It is shown that the hypothesis testing game admits no separating
(pure, fully informative) equilibria, there exist only pooling and partially-separating-pooling equilibria; i.e., non-
informative equilibria. Note that, in [35], the received message is designed by the deceiver (transmitter), whereas
we assume a Gaussian channel between the players. Further, the belief of the receiver (deceivee) about the priors is
affected by the design choices of the transmitter (deceiver), unlike this setup, in which constant beliefs are assumed.
Within the scope of the discussions above, the binary signaling problem investigated here can be motivated
under different application contexts: subjective priors and the presence of a bias in the objective function of the
transmitter compared to that of the receiver. In the former setup, players have a common goal but subjective prior
information, which necessarily alters the setup from a team problem to a game problem. The latter one is the
adaptation of the biased objective function of the transmitter in [17] to the binary signaling problem considered
here. We discuss these further in the following.
1.5 Contributions
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (i) A game theoretic formulation of the binary
signaling problem is established under subjective priors and/or subjective costs. (ii) The corresponding Stackelberg
and Nash equilibrium policies are obtained, and their properties (such as uniqueness and informativeness) are
investigated. It is proved that an equilibrium is almost always informative for a team setup, whereas in the case of
subjective priors and/or costs, it may cease to be informative. (iii) Furthermore, robustness of equilibrium solutions
to small perturbations in the priors or costs are established. It is shown that, the game equilibrium behavior around
the team setup is robust under the Nash assumption, whereas it is not robust under the Stackelberg assumption.
(iv) For each of the results, applications to two motivating setups (involving subjective priors and the presence of
a bias in the objective function of the transmitter) are presented.
In the conference version of this study [1], some of the results (in particular, the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium
solutions and their robustness properties) appear without proofs. Here we provide the full proofs of the main
theorems and also include the continuity analysis of the equilibrium. Furthermore, the setup and analysis presented
in [1] are extended to the multi-dimensional case and partially to the case with an average power constraint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The team setup, the Stackelberg setup, and the Nash setup of
the binary signaling game are investigated in Sections II, Section III, and Section IV, respectively. In Section V, the
multi-dimensional setup is studied, and in Section VI, the setup under an average power constraint is investigated.
The paper ends with Section VII, where some conclusions are drawn and directions for future research highlighted.
2 TEAM THEORETIC ANALYSIS: CLASSICAL SETUP with
IDENTICAL COSTS and PRIORS
Consider the team setup where the costs and the priors are assumed to be the same and available for both the
transmitter and the receiver; i.e., Cji = C
t
ji = C
r
ji and πi = π
t
i = π
r
i for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus the common Bayes risk
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becomes rt(S, δ) = rr(S, δ) = π0(C00P00 + C10P10) + π1(C01P01 + C11P11). The arguments for the proof of the
following result follow from the standard analysis in the detection and estimation literature [14, 15]. However, for
completeness, and for the relevance of the analysis in the following sections, a proof is included.
Theorem 2.1. Let τ , π0(C10−C00)
π1(C01−C11) . If τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, the team solution of the binary signaling setup is
non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ <∞, the team solution is always informative.
Proof. The players adjust S0, S1, and δ so that r
t(S, δ) = rr(S, δ) is minimized. The Bayes risk of the transmitter
and the receiver in (5) can be written as follows3:
rj(S, δ) = πj0Cj00 + πj1Cj11 + πj0(Cj10 − Cj00)P10 + πj1(Cj01 − Cj11)P01 , (8)
for j ∈ {t, r}.
Here, first the receiver chooses the optimal decision rule δ∗S0,S1 for any given signal levels S0 and S1, and then
the transmitter chooses the optimal signal levels S∗0 and S
∗
1 depending on the optimal receiver policy δ
∗
S0,S1
.
Assuming non-zero priors πt0, π
r
0 , π
t
1, and π
r
1 , the different cases for the optimal receiver decision rule can be
investigated by utilizing (4) as follows:
1. If Cr01 > C
r
11,
(a) if Cr10 > C
r
00, the LRT in (4) must be applied to determine the optimal decision.
(b) if Cr10 ≤ Cr00, the left-hand side (LHS) of the inequality in (4) is always greater than the right-hand side
(RHS); thus, the receiver always chooses H1.
2. If Cr01 = C
r
11,
(a) if Cr10 > C
r
00, the LHS of the inequality in (4) is always less than the RHS; thus, the receiver always
chooses H0.
(b) if Cr10 = C
r
00, the LHS and RHS of the inequality in (4) are equal; hence, the receiver is indifferent of
deciding H0 or H1.
(c) if Cr10 < C
r
00, the LHS of the inequality in (4) is always greater than the RHS; thus, the receiver always
chooses H1.
3. If Cr01 < C
r
11,
(a) if Cr10 ≥ Cr00, the LHS of the inequality in (4) is always less than the RHS; thus, the receiver always
chooses H0.
(b) if Cr10 < C
r
00, the LRT in (4) must be applied to determine the optimal decision.
The analysis above is summarized in Table 1:
As it can be observed from Table 1, the LRT is needed only when τ , π
r
0(C
r
10−Cr00)
πr1(C
r
01−Cr11) takes a finite positive value;
i.e., 0 < τ < ∞. Otherwise; i.e., τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, since the receiver does not consider any message sent by the
transmitter, the equilibrium is non-informative.
For 0 < τ < ∞, let ζ , sgn(Cr01 − Cr11) (notice that ζ = sgn(Cr01 − Cr11) = sgn(Cr10 − Cr00) and ζ ∈ {−1, 1}).
Then, the optimal decision rule for the receiver in (4) becomes
δ :
{
ζ
p1(y)
p0(y)
H1
R
H0
ζ
πr0(C
r
10 − Cr00)
πr1(C
r
01 − Cr11)
= ζτ . (9)
3Note that we are still keeping the parameters of the transmitter and the receiver as distinct in order to be able to utilize the
expressions for the game formulations.
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Table 1: Optimal decision rule analysis for the receiver.
Cr
10
> Cr
00
Cr
10
= Cr
00
Cr
10
< Cr
00
Cr
01
> Cr
11
LRT always H1 always H1
Cr
01
= Cr
11
always H0 indifferent (H0 or H1) always H1
Cr
01
< Cr
11
always H0 always H0 LRT
Let the transmitter choose optimal signals S = {S0, S1}. Then the measurements in (1) become Hi : Y ∼ N (Si, σ2)
for i ∈ {0, 1}, as N ∼ N (0, σ2), and the optimal decision rule for the receiver is obtained by utilizing (9) as
δ∗S0,S1 :
{
ζy(S1 − S0)
H1
R
H0
ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) +
S21 − S20
2
)
. (10)
Since ζY (S1−S0) is distributed asN
(
ζ(S1−S0)Si, (S1−S0)2σ2
)
underHi for i ∈ {0, 1}, the conditional probabilities
can be written based on (10) as follows:
P10 = Pr(y ∈ Γ1|H0) = Pr(δ(y) = 1|H0) = 1− Pr(δ(y) = 0|H0) = 1− P00
= Q
(
ζ
(
σ ln(τ)
|S1 − S0| +
|S1 − S0|
2σ
))
, (11)
and similarly, P01 can be derived as P01 = Q
(
ζ
(
− σ ln(τ)|S1−S0| +
|S1−S0|
2σ
))
.
By defining d , |S1−S0|
σ
, P10 = Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
d
+ d2
))
and P01 = Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
d
+ d2
))
can be obtained. Then, the
optimum behavior of the transmitter can be found by analyzing the derivative of the Bayes risk of the transmitter
in (8) with respect to d:
d rt(S, δ)
d d
= − 1√
2π
exp
{
− (ln τ)
2
2d2
}
exp
{
−d
2
8
}
×
(
πt0ζ(C
t
10 − Ct00)τ−
1
2
(
− ln τ
d2
+
1
2
)
+ πt1ζ(C
t
01 − Ct11)τ
1
2
(
ln τ
d2
+
1
2
))
.
(12)
In (12), if we utilize Cji = C
t
ji = C
r
ji, πi = π
t
i = π
r
i and τ =
π0(C10−C00)
π1(C01−C11) , we obtain the following:
d rt(S, δ)
d d
= − 1√
2π
exp
{
− (ln τ)
2
2d2
}
exp
{
−d
2
8
}√
π0π1(C10 − C00)(C01 − C11) < 0 .
Thus, in order to minimize the Bayes risk, the transmitter always prefers the maximum d, i.e., d∗ =
√
P0+
√
P1
σ
, and
the equilibrium is informative.
Remark 2.1. (i) Note that there are two informative equilibrium points which satisfy d∗ =
√
P0+
√
P1
σ
: (S∗0 , S
∗
1 ) =(−√P0,√P1) and (S∗0 , S∗1 ) = (√P0,−√P1), and the decision rule of the receiver is chosen based on the rule
in (10) accordingly. Actually, these equilibrium points are essentially unique; i.e., they result in the same
Bayes risks for the transmitter and the receiver.
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(ii) In the non-informative equilibrium, the receiver chooses either H0 or H1 as depicted in Table 1. Since the
message sent by the transmitter has no effect on the equilibrium, there are infinitely many ways of signal
selection, which implies infinitely many equilibrium points. However, all these points are essentially unique;
i.e., they result in the same Bayes risks for the transmitter and the receiver. Actually, if the receiver always
chooses Hi, the Bayes risks of the players are rj(S, δ) = πj0Cji0 + πj1Cji1 for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {t, r}.
3 STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Stackelberg assumption, first the transmitter (the leader agent) announces and commits to a particular
policy, and then the receiver (the follower agent) acts accordingly. In this direction, first the transmitter chooses
optimal signals S = {S0, S1} to minimize his Bayes risk rt(S, δ), then the receiver chooses an optimal decision rule
δ accordingly to minimize his Bayes risk rr(S, δ). Due to the sequential structure of the Stackelberg game, besides
his own priors and costs, the transmitter also knows the priors and the costs of the receiver so that he can adjust
his optimal policy accordingly. On the other hand, besides his own priors and costs, the receiver knows only the
policy and the action (signals S = {S0, S1}) of the transmitter as he announces during the game-play; i.e., the costs
and priors of the transmitter are not available to the receiver.
3.1 Equilibrium Solutions
Under the Stackelberg assumption, the equilibrium structure of the binary signaling game can be characterized as
follows:
Theorem 3.1. If τ , π
r
0(C
r
10−Cr00)
πr1(C
r
01−Cr11) ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the binary signaling game is
non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ < ∞, let d , |S1−S0|
σ
, dmax ,
√
P0+
√
P1
σ
, ζ , sgn(Cr01 − Cr11), k0 ,
πt0ζ(C
t
10 − Ct00)τ−
1
2 , and k1 , πt1ζ(Ct01 − Ct11)τ
1
2 . Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium structure can be characterized
as in Table 2, where d∗ = 0 stands for a non-informative equilibrium, and a nonzero d∗ corresponds to an informative
equilibrium.
Table 2: Stackelberg equilibrium analysis for 0 < τ <∞.
ln τ (k0 − k1) < 0 ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0
k0 + k1 < 0 d
∗ = min
{
dmax,
√∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣} d∗ = 0, non-informative
k0 + k1 ≥ 0 d
∗ = dmax
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ ( k1
k0τ
)sgn(ln(τ))
Q
( | ln(τ)|
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
( | ln(τ)|
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we make the following remark:
Remark 3.1. As we observed in Theorem 2.1, for a team setup, an equilibrium is almost always informative
(practically, 0 < τ <∞), whereas in the case of subjective priors and/or costs, it may cease to be informative.
Proof. By applying the same case analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, it can be deduced that the equilibrium
is non-informative if τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞ (see Table 1). Thus, 0 < τ < ∞ can be assumed. Then, from (12), rt(S, δ)
is a monotone decreasing (increasing) function of d if k0
(− ln τ
d2
+ 12
)
+ k1
(
ln τ
d2
+ 12
)
, or equivalently d2(k0 + k1) −
2 ln τ (k0 − k1) is positive (negative) ∀d, where k0 and k1 are as defined in the theorem statement. Therefore, one
of the following cases is applicable:
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1. if ln τ (k0−k1) < 0 and k0+k1 ≥ 0, then d2(k0+k1) > 2 ln τ(k0−k1) is satisfied ∀d, which means that rt(S, δ) is
a monotone decreasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter tries to maximize d; i.e., chooses the maximum
of |S1 − S0| under the constraints |S0|2 ≤ P0 and |S1|2 ≤ P1, hence d∗ = max |S1−S0|σ =
√
P0+
√
P1
σ
= dmax,
which entails an informative equilibrium.
2. if ln τ (k0 − k1) < 0, k0 + k1 < 0, and d2max <
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, then rt(S, δ) is a monotone decreasing function
of d. Therefore, the transmitter maximizes d as in the previous case.
3. if ln τ (k0−k1) < 0, k0+k1 < 0, and d2max ≥
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, since d2(k0+k1)−2 ln τ (k0−k1) is initially positive
then negative, rt(S, δ) is first decreasing and then increasing with respect to d. Therefore, the transmitter
chooses the optimal d∗ such that (d∗)2 =
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣ which results in a minimal Bayes risk rt(S, δ) for the
transmitter. This is depicted in Figure 1.
4. if ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0 and k0 + k1 < 0, then d2(k0 + k1) < 2 ln τ(k0 − k1) is satisfied ∀d, which means that
rt(S, δ) is a monotone increasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter tries to minimize d; i.e., chooses
S0 = S1 so that d
∗ = 0. In this case, the transmitter does not provide any information to the receiver and
the decision rule of the receiver in (9) becomes δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ ; i.e., the receiver uses only the prior information,
thus the equilibrium is non-informative.
5. if ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0, k0+ k1 ≥ 0, and d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, then rt(S, δ) is a monotone increasing function of
d. Therefore, the transmitter chooses S0 = S1 so that d
∗ = 0. Similar to the previous case, the equilibrium
is non-informative.
6. if ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0, k0 + k1 ≥ 0, and d2max ≥
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, rt(S, δ) is first an increasing then a decreasing
function of d, which makes the transmitter choose either the minimum d or the maximum d; i.e., he chooses the
one that results in a lower Bayes risk rt(S, δ) for the transmitter. If the minimum Bayes risk is achieved when
d∗ = 0, then the equilibrium is non-informative; otherwise (i.e., when the minimum Bayes risk is achieved
when d∗ = dmax), the equilibrium is an informative one. There are three possible cases:
(a) ζ(1− τ) > 0 :
i. If d∗ = 0, since δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ , the receiver always chooses H1, thus P10 = P11 = 1 and P00 = P01 = 0.
Then, from (8), rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00 + πt1Ct11 + πt0(Ct10 − Ct00).
ii. If d∗ = dmax, by utilizing (8) and (11), rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00+πt1Ct11+πt0(Ct10−Ct00)Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+ dmax2
))
+
πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+ dmax2
))
.
Then the decision of the transmitter is determined by the following:
πt0(C
t
10 − Ct00)
d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
πt0(C
t
10 − Ct00)Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
))
+ πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
))
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πt0(C
t
10 − Ct00)Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
))
ζk0τQ
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
ζk1Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
))
(13)
For (13), there are two possible cases:
i. ζ = 1 and 0 < τ < 1 : Since ln τ(k0 − k1) ≥ 0⇒ k0 − k1 ≤ 0 and k0 + k1 ≥ 0, k1 ≥ 0 always. Then,
(13) becomes
k0τ
k1
Q
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
ii. ζ = −1 and τ > 1 : Since ln τ(k0 − k1) ≥ 0 ⇒ k0 − k1 ≥ 0 and k0 + k1 ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0 always. Then,
(13) becomes
k1
k0τ
Q
(
ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
(b) ζ(1− τ) = 0⇔ τ = 1 : Since k0 + k1 ≥ 0 and d2(k0 + k1) − 2 ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0, rt(S, δ) is a monotone
decreasing function of d, which implies d∗ = dmax and informative equilibrium.
(c) ζ(1− τ) < 0 :
i. If d∗ = 0, since δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ , the receiver always chooses H0, thus P00 = P01 = 1 and P10 = P11 = 0.
Then, from (8), rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00 + πt1Ct11 + πt1(Ct01 − Ct11).
ii. If d∗ = dmax, by utilizing (8) and (11), rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00+πt1Ct11+πt0(Ct10−Ct00)Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+ dmax2
))
+
πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+ dmax2
))
.
Then, similar to the analysis in case-a), the decision of the transmitter is determined by the following:
ζk1Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
ζk0τQ
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
))
(14)
For (14), there are two possible cases:
i. ζ = −1 and 0 < τ < 1 : Since ln τ(k0−k1) ≥ 0⇒ k0−k1 ≤ 0 and k0+k1 ≥ 0, k1 ≥ 0 always. Then,
(14) becomes
k0τ
k1
Q
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
(
− ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
ii. ζ = 1 and τ > 1 : Since ln τ(k0 − k1) ≥ 0⇒ k0 − k1 ≥ 0 and k0 + k1 ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0 always. Then, (14)
becomes
k1
k0τ
Q
(
ln(τ)
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
(
ln(τ)
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
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Thus, by combining all the cases, the comparison of the transmitter Bayes risks for d∗ = 0 and d∗ = dmax
reduces to the following rule:(
k1
k0τ
)sgn(ln(τ))
Q
( | ln(τ)|
dmax
− dmax
2
)
−Q
( | ln(τ)|
dmax
+
dmax
2
) d∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0 . (15)
The most interesting case is Case-3 in which ln τ (k0 − k1) < 0, k0 + k1 < 0, and d2max ≥
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, since
in all other cases, the transmitter chooses either the minimum or the maximum distance between the signal levels.
Further, for classical hypothesis-testing in the team setup, the optimal distance corresponds to the maximum
separation [14]. However, in Case-3, there is an optimal distance d∗ =
√∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣ < dmax that makes the Bayes
risk of the transmitter minimum as it can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Bayes risk of the transmitter versus d when Ct00 = 0.6, C
t
10 = 0.4, C
t
01 = 0.4, C
t
11 = 0.6, C
r
00 = 0, C
r
10 = 0.9, C
r
01 =
0.4, Cr11 = 0, pi
t
0 = 0.25, pi
r
0 = 0.25, P0 = 1, P1 = 1, and σ = 0.1. The optimal d
∗ =
√∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣ = 0.4704 < dmax = 20 and its
corresponding Bayes risk rt = 0.5379 are indicated by the star.
Remark 3.2. Similar to the team setup analysis, for every possible case in Table 2, there are more than one
equilibrium points, and they are essentially unique since the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver depend
on d. In particular,
(i) for d∗ = dmax, the equilibrium is informative, (S∗0 , S
∗
1 ) =
(−√P0,√P1) and (S∗0 , S∗1 ) = (√P0,−√P1) are the
only possible choices for the transmitter, which are essentially unique, and the decision rule of the receiver is
chosen based on the rule in (10).
(ii) for d∗ =
√∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, the equilibrium is informative, there are infinitely many choices for the transmitter
and the receiver, and all of them are essentially unique; i.e., they result in the same Bayes risks for the
transmitter and the receiver.
12
(iii) for d∗ = 0 or τ /∈ (0,∞), the equilibrium is non-informative and there are infinitely many equilibrium points
which are essentially unique; see Remark 2.1-(ii).
3.2 Continuity and Robustness to Perturbations around the Team Setup
We now investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values. In particular, we
consider the perturbations around the team setup; i.e., at the point of identical priors and costs.
Define the perturbation around the team setup as ǫ = {ǫπ0, ǫπ1, ǫ00, ǫ01, ǫ10, ǫ11} ∈ R6 such that πti = πri +ǫπi and
Ctji = C
r
ji+ ǫji for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (note that the transmitter parameters are perturbed around the receiver parameters
which are assumed to be fixed). Then, for 0 < τ <∞, at the point of identical priors and costs, small perturbations
in both priors and costs imply k0 = (π
r
0+ǫπ0)ζ(C
r
10−Cr00+ǫ10−ǫ00)τ−
1
2 and k1 = (π
r
1+ǫπ1)ζ(C
r
01−Cr11+ǫ01−ǫ11)τ
1
2 .
Since, for 0 < τ <∞, k0 = k1 =
√
πr0π
r
1
√
(Cr10 − Cr00)(Cr01 − Cr11) > 0 at the point of identical priors and costs, it
is possible to obtain both positive and negative (k0 − k1) by choosing the appropriate perturbation ǫ around the
team setup. Then, as it can be observed from Table 2, even the equilibrium may alter from an informative one to
a non-informative one; hence, under the Stackelberg equilibrium, the policies are not continuous with respect to
small perturbations around the point of identical priors and costs, and the equilibrium behavior is not robust to
small perturbations in both priors and costs.
3.3 Application to the Motivating Examples
3.3.1 Subjective Priors
Referring to Section 1.3.1, for 0 < τ <∞, the related parameters can be found as follows (note that the equilibrium
is non-informative if τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞):
τ =
πr0(C10 − C00)
πr1(C01 − C11)
,
k0 = π
t
0
√
πr1
πr0
√
(C10 − C00)(C01 − C11) ,
k1 = π
t
1
√
πr0
πr1
√
(C10 − C00)(C01 − C11) .
Since k0 + k1 > 0, depending on the values of ln τ (k0 − k1), d2max, and
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣, Case-1, Case-5 or Case-6 of
Theorem 3.1 may hold as depicted in Table 3. Here, the decision rule in Case-6 is the same as (15).
Table 3: Stackelberg equilibrium analysis of subjective priors case for 0 < τ <∞.
0 < τ < 1 1 ≤ τ <∞
pi
t
0
pi
t
1
<
pi
r
0
pi
r
1
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-5 applies, d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-6 applies Case-1 applies, d
∗ = dmax
pi
t
0
pi
t
1
≥
pi
r
0
pi
r
1
Case-1 applies, d∗ = dmax
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-5 applies, d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-6 applies
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3.3.2 Biased Transmitter Cost
Based on the arguments in Section 1.3.2, the related parameters can be found as follows:
τ =
π0
π1
, k0 =
√
π0π1(2α− 1) , k1 = √π0π1(2α− 1) .
Then, ln τ (k0 − k1) = 0 and k0 + k1 = 2√π0π1(2α − 1); hence, either Case-4 or Case-6 of Theorem 3.1 applies.
Namely, if α < 1/2 (Case-4 of Theorem 3.1 applies), the transmitter chooses S0 = S1 to minimize d and the
equilibrium is non-informative; i.e., he does not send any meaningful information to the transmitter and the receiver
considers only the priors. If α = 1/2, the transmitter has no control on his Bayes risk, hence the equilibrium is
non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if α > 1/2 (Case-6 of Theorem 3.1 applies), the equilibrium is always informative.
In other words, if α > 1/2, the players act like a team. As it can be seen, the informativeness of the equilibrium
depends on α = Pr(b = 0), the probability that the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver are aligned.
4 NASH GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Nash assumption, the transmitter chooses optimal signals S = {S0, S1} to minimize rt(S, δ), and the
receiver chooses optimal decision rule δ to minimize rr(S, δ) simultaneously. In this Nash setup, the transmitter
and the receiver do not need to know the priors and the costs of each other; they need to know only their own priors
and costs while calculating the best response to a given action of other player. Further, there is no commitment
between the transmitter and the receiver. Due to this difference, the equilibrium structure and robustness properties
of the Nash equilibrium show significant differences from the ones in the Stackelberg equilibrium, as stated in the
following.
In the analysis, we assume deterministic policies for the transmitter and receiver, and we restrict the receiver to
use only the single-threshold rules. Although a single-threshold rule is sub-optimal for the receiver in general, it is
always optimal for Gaussian densities, and always optimal for uni-modal densities under the maximum likelihood
decision rule [14, 36].
4.1 Equilibrium Solutions
Under the Nash assumption, the equilibrium structure of the binary signaling game can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 4.1. Let τ , π
r
0(C
r
10−Cr00)
πr1(C
r
01−Cr11) and ζ , sgn(C
r
01 −Cr11), ξ0 , C
t
10−Ct00
Cr10−Cr00 , and ξ1 ,
Ct01−Ct11
Cr01−Cr11 . If τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞,
then the Nash equilibrium of the binary signaling game is non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ <∞, the Nash
equilibrium structure is as depicted in Table 4.
Table 4: Nash equilibrium analysis for 0 < τ <∞.
ξ0 > 0 ξ0 = 0 ξ0 < 0
ξ1 > 0 unique informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium
P0 > P1 ⇒ non-informative equilibrium
P0 = P1 ⇒ non-informative equilibrium
P0 < P1 ⇒ unique informative equilibrium
ξ1 = 0 non-informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium
ξ1 < 0
P0 > P1 ⇒ unique informative equilibrium
P0 = P1 ⇒ non-informative equilibrium
P0 < P1 ⇒ non-informative equilibrium
non-informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium
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Proof. Let the transmitter choose any signals S = {S0, S1}. Assuming nonzero priors πt0, πr0 , πt1 and πr1 , the optimal
decision for the receiver is given by (10). By applying the same extreme case analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
the equilibrium is non-informative if τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞ (see Table 1); thus, 0 < τ <∞ can be assumed.
Now assume that the receiver applies a single-threshold rule; i.e., δ :
{
ay
H1
R
H0
η where a ∈ R and η ∈ R.
Remark 4.1. Note that for a = 0, the receiver chooses either always H0 or always H1 without considering the
value of y, which implies a non-informative equilibrium. Therefore, S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1) (i.e., the
decision rule of the receiver is δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ) constitute a non-informative equilibrium regardless of the values of the
priors and costs of the players.
Thus, due to the remark above, it can be assumed that a 6= 0 holds. Since aY ∼ N
(
aSi, a
2σ2
)
under Hi for
i ∈ {0, 1}, the conditional probabilities are P10 = Q
(
η−aS0
|a|σ
)
and P01 = Q
(
− η−aS1|a|σ
)
. Then, the Bayes risk of the
transmitter becomes
rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00 + πt1Ct11 + πt0(Ct10 − Ct00)Q
(
η − aS0
|a|σ
)
+ πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
−η − aS1|a|σ
)
. (16)
Since the power constraints are |S0|2 ≤ P0 and |S1|2 ≤ P1, the signals S0 and S1 can be regarded as independent,
and the optimum signals S = {S0, S1} can be found by analyzing the derivative of the Bayes risk of the transmitter
with respect to the signals:
∂ rt(S, δ)
∂ Si
=
sgn(a)√
2πσ
πti(C
t
1i − Ct0i) exp
{
−1
2
(
η − aSi
|a|σ
)2}
.
Then, for i ∈ {0, 1}, the following cases hold:
1. Ct1i = C
t
0i ⇒ Si has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter.
2. Ct1i 6= Ct0i ⇒ rt(S, δ) is a decreasing (increasing) function of Si if a(Ct1i −Ct0i) is negative (positive); thus the
transmitter chooses the optimal signal levels as S0 = −sgn(a)sgn(Ct10 − Ct00)
√
P0 and S1 = sgn(a)sgn(C
t
01 −
Ct11)
√
P1.
By using the expressions above, the cases can be listed as follows:
1. τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞ ⇒ The equilibrium is non-informative.
2. Ct10 = C
t
00 (and/or C
t
01 = C
t
11) ⇒ S0 (and/or S1) has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter; thus it
can arbitrarily be chosen by the transmitter. In this case, if the transmitter chooses S0 = S1; i.e., he does
not send anything useful to the receiver, and the receiver applies the decision rule δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ ; i.e., he only
considers the prior information (totally discards the information sent by the transmitter). Therefore, there
exists a non-informative equilibrium.
3. Notice that, since 0 < τ <∞ is assumed, ζ = sgn(Cr01−Cr11) = sgn(Cr10−Cr00) is obtained. Now, assume that
the decision rule of the receiver is δ :
{
ay
H1
R
H0
η. Then, the transmitter selects S0 = −sgn(a)sgn(Ct10−Ct00)
√
P0
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and S1 = sgn(a)sgn(C
t
01−Ct11)
√
P1 as optimal signals, and the decision rule becomes (10). By combining the
best responses of the transmitter and the receiver,
a = ζ(S1 − S0) = ζsgn(a)
(
sgn(Ct01 − Ct11)
√
P1 + sgn(C
t
10 − Ct00)
√
P0
)
⇒sgn(a) = ζsgn(a) sgn
(
sgn(Ct01 − Ct11)
√
P1 + sgn(C
t
10 − Ct00)
√
P0
)
⇒ sgn(C
t
01 − Ct11)
sgn(Cr01 − Cr11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ1)
√
P1 +
sgn(Ct10 − Ct00)
sgn(Cr10 − Cr00)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ0)
√
P0 > 0 (17)
is obtained. Here, unless (17) is satisfied, the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver cannot match
each other. Then, there are four possible cases:
(a) ξ0 < 0 and ξ1 < 0⇒ (17) cannot be satisfied; thus, the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver
do not match each other, which results in the absence of a Nash equilibrium for a 6= 0. However, as
discussed in Remark 4.1, S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1) always constitute a non-informative
equilibrium.
(b) ξ0 < 0 and ξ1 > 0 ⇒ (17) is satisfied only when
√
P1 >
√
P0. If
√
P1 <
√
P0, (17) cannot be satisfied
and the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver do not match each other, which results in
the absence of a Nash equilibrium for a 6= 0. However, due to Remark 4.1, for a = 0, there always
exist non-informative equilibria. If
√
P1 =
√
P0 (which implies S0 = S1), then the receiver applies
δ :
{
ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ as in Case-2, and the receiver chooses either always H0 or always H1. Hence, there exists a
non-informative equilibrium; i.e., the transmitter sends dummy signals, and the receiver makes a decision
without considering the transmitted signals.
(c) ξ0 > 0 and ξ1 < 0 ⇒ (17) is satisfied only when
√
P0 >
√
P1. If
√
P0 <
√
P1, (17) cannot be satisfied
and the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver do not match each other, which results in the
absence of a Nash equilibrium for a 6= 0. However, due to Remark 4.1, for a = 0, there always exist
non-informative equilibria. If
√
P1 =
√
P0 (which implies S0 = S1), then the receiver applies δ :
{
ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ
as in Case-2, and the equilibrium is non-informative.
(d) ξ0 > 0 and ξ1 > 0 ⇒ (17) is always satisfied; thus, the consistency is established, and there exists an
informative equilibrium.
As it can be deduced from Table 4, as the costs related to both hypotheses are aligned4 for the transmitter
and the receiver, the Nash equilibrium is informative. If the power limit corresponding to the hypothesis that has
aligned costs for the transmitter and receiver is greater than the power limit of the other hypothesis, again, there
exists an informative equilibrium. For the other cases, there may exist non-informative equilibrium.
4ξi is the indicator that the transmitter and the receiver have similar preferences about hypothesis Hi; i.e., if ξi > 0, then both the
transmitter and the receiver aim to transmit and decode the hypothesis Hi correctly (or incorrectly). If ξi < 0, then the transmitter
and the receiver have conflicting goals over hypothesis Hi; i.e., one of them tries to achieve the correct transmission and decoding,
whereas the goal of the other player is the opposite.
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Remark 4.2. (i) We emphasize that, under the Nash formulation, while calculating the best responses, the trans-
mitter and the receiver do not need to know the priors and the costs of each other. In particular,
– for a given decision rule of the receiver δ :
{
ay
H1
R
H0
η, the best response of the transmitter is SBR0 =
−sgn(a)sgn(Ct10 − Ct00)
√
P0 and S
BR
1 = sgn(a)sgn(C
t
01 − Ct11)
√
P1.
– similarly, for a given signal design S0 and S1 of the transmitter, the best response of the receiver is
aBR = ζ(S1 − S0) and ηBR = ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) + (S1)
2−(S0)2
2
)
.
(ii) As shown in Theorem 4.1, at the informative Nash equilibrium, the transmitter selects S∗0 = −sgn(a∗)sgn(Ct10−
Ct00)
√
P0 and S
∗
1 = sgn(a
∗)sgn(Ct01 −Ct11)
√
P1, and the decision rule of the receiver is δ
∗ :
{
a∗y
H1
R
H0
η∗, where
a∗ = ζ(S∗1 −S∗0 ) and η∗ = ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) +
(S∗1 )
2−(S∗0 )2
2
)
. Similar to the team and Stackelberg setup analyses, the
informative equilibrium is essentially unique in the Nash case, too; i.e., if (S∗0 , S
∗
1 , a
∗, η∗) is an equilibrium
point, then (−S∗0 ,−S∗1 ,−a∗, η∗) is another equilibrium point, and they both result in the same Bayes risks for
the transmitter and the receiver.
(iii) For the non-informative equilibrium, as discussed in Remark 4.1, the optimal strategies of the transmitter
and the receiver are determined by S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1); which results in essentially unique
equilibria (see Remark 2.1-(ii)).
Even though the transmitter and the receiver do not know the private parameters of each other, they can achieve
(converge) to an equilibrium. Note that, due to Remark 4.2-(i), for any arbitrary receiver strategy (a, η), the best
response of the transmitter (SBR0 , S
BR
1 ) is one of the four possibilities: (
√
P0,
√
P1), (−
√
P0,
√
P1), (
√
P0,−
√
P1),
or (−√P0,−
√
P1). Then, the corresponding best responses of the receiver are characterized by (a
BR
1 , η
BR),
(aBR2 , η
BR), (−aBR2 , ηBR), or (−aBR1 , ηBR), respectively, where aBR1 , ζ(
√
P1 −
√
P0), a
BR
2 , ζ(
√
P1 +
√
P0), and
ηBR = ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) + P1−P02
)
. By continuing these iterations, the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver
can be combined and (17) is obtained. If their private parameters (priors and costs) satisfy the condition of the
unique informative equilibrium in Table IV, their best responses match each other, so the best-response dynam-
ics converges to an equilibrium (e.g., (a, η) → (√P0,
√
P1) → (aBR1 , ηBR) → (
√
P0,
√
P1) → · · · ). Otherwise, the
optimal strategies (best responses) of the transmitter and the receiver oscillate between two best responses; e.g.,
(a, η) → (√P0,
√
P1) → (aBR1 , ηBR) → (−
√
P0,−
√
P1) → (−aBR1 , ηBR) → (
√
P0,
√
P1) → · · · . Then, they deduce
that there exist only non-informative equilibria, in which S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1) (see Remark 4.2-(iii)).
Note that, when a 6= 0, the misalignment between the costs can even induce a scenario, in which there exists
no equilibrium. For a 6= 0, the main reason for the absence of a non-informative (babbling) equilibrium under
the Nash assumption is that in the binary signaling game setup, the receiver is forced to make a decision. Using
only the prior information, the receiver always chooses one of the hypothesis. By knowing this, the transmitter
can manipulate his signaling strategy for his own benefit. However, after this manipulation, the receiver no longer
keeps his decision rule the same; namely, the best response of the receiver alters based on the signaling strategy
of the transmitter, which entails another change of the best response of the transmitter. Due to such an infinite
recursion, the optimal policies of the transmitter and the receiver keep changing, and thus, there does not exist
a pure Nash equilibrium unless a = 0; i.e., due to Remark 4.1, there always exist non-informative equilibria with
S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1).
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4.2 Continuity and Robustness to Perturbations around the Team Setup
Similar to that in Section 3.2 for the Stackelberg setup, the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on
equilibrium values around the team setup are investigated for the Nash setup as follows:
Define the perturbation around the team setup as ǫ = {ǫπ0, ǫπ1, ǫ00, ǫ01, ǫ10, ǫ11} ∈ R6 such that πti = πri +ǫπi and
Ctji = C
r
ji+ ǫji for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (note that the transmitter parameters are perturbed around the receiver parameters
which are assumed to be fixed). Then, for 0 < τ <∞, at the point of identical priors and costs, small perturbations
in priors and costs imply ξ0 =
Cr10−Cr00+ǫ10−ǫ00
Cr10−Cr00 and ξ1 =
Cr01−Cr11+ǫ01−ǫ11
Cr01−Cr11 . As it can be seen, the Nash equilibrium
is not affected by small perturbations in priors. Further, since ξ0 = ξ1 = 1 at the point of identical priors and costs
for 0 < τ < ∞, as long as the perturbation ǫ is chosen such that
∣∣∣ ǫ10−ǫ00Cr10−Cr00
∣∣∣ < 1 and ∣∣∣ ǫ01−ǫ11Cr01−Cr11
∣∣∣ < 1, we always
obtain positive ξ0 and ξ1 in Table 4. Thus, under the Nash assumption, the equilibrium behavior is robust to small
perturbations in both priors and costs.
For the continuity analysis, first consider a non-informative equilibrium; i.e., the policies are S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0,
and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1), which are independent of the values of the priors and costs of the players. Thus, consider
when a 6= 0; i.e., an informative equilibrium: if the priors and costs are perturbed around the team setup, S0 =
−sgn(a)sgn(Cr10 − Cr00 + ǫ10 − ǫ00)
√
P0 and S1 = sgn(a)sgn(C
r
01 − Cr11 + ǫ01 − ǫ11)
√
P1 are obtained. As long
as the perturbation ǫ is chosen such that
∣∣∣ ǫ10−ǫ00Cr10−Cr00
∣∣∣ < 1 and ∣∣∣ ǫ01−ǫ11Cr01−Cr11
∣∣∣ < 1, the changes in η, S0 and S1 are
continuous with respect to perturbations; actually, the values of the equilibrium parameters remain constant;
i.e., either (S∗0 , S
∗
1 , a
∗, η∗) =
(
−ζ√P0, ζ
√
P1, (
√
P0 +
√
P1), ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) +
S21−S20
2
))
or the essentially equivalent one
(S∗0 , S
∗
1 , a
∗, η∗) =
(
ζ
√
P0,−ζ
√
P1,−(
√
P0 +
√
P1), ζ
(
σ2 ln(τ) +
S21−S20
2
))
holds. Thus, the policies are continuous
with respect to small perturbations around the point of identical priors and costs.
4.3 Application to the Motivating Examples
4.3.1 Subjective Priors
The related parameters are τ =
πr0(C10−C00)
πr1(C01−C11) , ξ0 = 1, and ξ1 = 1. Thus, if τ < 0 or τ = ∞, the equilibrium is
non-informative; otherwise, there always exists a unique informative equilibrium.
4.3.2 Biased Transmitter Cost
Based on the arguments in Section 1.3.2, the related parameters can be found as follows:
Ct01 = C
t
10 = α and C
t
00 = C
t
11 = 1− α
Cr01 = C
r
10 = 1 and C
r
00 = C
r
11 = 0
τ =
π0(C
r
10 − Cr00)
π1(Cr01 − Cr11)
=
π0
π1
ξ0 =
Ct10 − Ct00
Cr10 − Cr00
= 2α− 1
ξ1 =
Ct01 − Ct11
Cr01 − Cr11
= 2α− 1
If α > 1/2 (Case-3-d of Theorem 4.1 applies), the players act like a team and the equilibrium is informative. If
α = 1/2 (Case-2 of Theorem 4.1 applies), the equilibrium is non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if α < 1/2 (Case-3-a
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of Theorem 4.1 applies), there exist non-informative equilibria. As it can be seen, the existence of the equilibrium
depends on α = Pr(b = 0), the probability that the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver are aligned.
5 EXTENSION to the MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CASE
When the transmitter sends a multi-dimensional signal over a multi-dimensional channel, or the receiver takes
multiple samples from the observed waveform, the scalar analysis considered heretofore is not applicable anymore;
thus, the vector case can be investigated. In this direction, the binary hypothesis-testing problem aforementioned
can be modified as
H0 : Y = S0 +N ,
H1 : Y = S1 +N ,
where Y is the observation (measurement) vector that belongs to the observation set Γ = Rn, S0 and S1 denote
the deterministic signals under hypothesis H0 and hypothesis H1, such that S , {S : ‖S0‖2 ≤ P0 , ‖S1‖2 ≤ P1},
respectively, and N represents a zero-mean Gaussian noise vector with the positive definite covariance matrix Σ;
i.e., N ∼ N (0,Σ). All the other parameters (πki and Ckji for i, j ∈ {0, 1} and k ∈ {t, r}) and their definitions remain
unchanged.
5.1 Team Setup Analysis
Theorem 5.1. Theorem 2.1 also holds for the vector case: if 0 < τ <∞, the team solution is always informative;
otherwise, there exist only non-informative equilibria.
Proof. Let the transmitter choose optimal signals S = {S0,S1}. Then the measurements become Hi : Y ∼ N (Si,Σ)
for i ∈ {0, 1}. As in the scalar case in Theorem 2.1, the equilibrium is non-informative for τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞; hence,
0 < τ <∞ can be assumed. Similar to (10), the optimal decision rule for the receiver is obtained by utilizing (9) as
δ∗
S0,S1
:
{
ζ
p1(y)
p0(y)
H1
R
H0
ζ
πr0(C
r
10 − Cr00)
πr1(C
r
01 − Cr11)
, ζτ
:
{
ζ
1√
(2π)n|Σ| exp
{− 12 (y − S1)TΣ−1(y − S1)}
1√
(2π)n|Σ| exp
{− 12 (y − S0)TΣ−1(y − S0)}
H1
R
H0
ζτ
:
{
ζ(S1 − S0)TΣ−1y
H1
R
H0
ζ
(
ln(τ) +
1
2
(S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 + S0)
)
. (18)
Since, under hypothesis Hi, ζ(S1 − S0)TΣ−1Y ∼ N
(
ζ(S1 − S0)TΣ−1Si, (S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 − S0)
)
for i ∈ {0, 1},
by defining d2 , (S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 − S0), the conditional probabilities can be written as follows:
P10 = Q
(
ζ
ln(τ) + 12 (S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 + S0 − 2S0)√
(S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 − S0)
)
= Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
d
+
d
2
))
P01 = 1−Q
(
ζ
ln(τ) + 12 (S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 + S0 − 2S1)√
(S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 − S0)
)
= 1−Q
(
ζ
(
ln(τ)
d
− d
2
))
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= Q
(
ζ
(
− ln(τ)
d
+
d
2
))
. (19)
Notice that the conditional probabilities are the same in (11) and (19); therefore, in the vector case, the equilibrium is
always informative, and the transmitter always prefers the maximum distance similar to the scalar case. However,
selecting optimal vector signals is not as trivial as in the scalar case; see [14, pp. 61–63] for details. Since the
eigenvector with the largest (smallest) eigenvalue of Σ corresponds to the direction, along which the noise is most
(least) powerful, signaling in the least noisy direction results in the highest signal-to-noise power ratio for the
system. Accordingly, the optimum signals are S0 = ±
√
P0
νmin
‖νmin‖ and S1 = ∓
√
P1
νmin
‖νmin‖ , which corresponds to
d2max =
(
√
P0+
√
P1)
2
λmin
, where λmin is the minimum eigenvalue of Σ and νmin is the eigenvector corresponding to
λmin [14, pp. 61–63].
5.2 Stackelberg Game Analysis
Theorem 5.2. Let d ,
√
(S1 − S0)TΣ−1(S1 − S0) and d2max , (
√
P0+
√
P1)
2
λmin
, where λmin is the minimum eigenvalue
of Σ. Then Theorem 3.1 also holds for the vector case.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be applied by modifying the definitions of d and dmax as in the statement.
For d∗ = dmax, the method described in the proof of Theorem 5.1 can be applied for the optimal signal selection,
whereas, for d∗ = 0, by choosing S0 = S1, the non-informative equilibrium can be achieved. Further, for Case-3 of
Theorem 3.1, in order to achieve (d∗)2 =
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣ < d2max, the signals can be chosen in the direction of νmin, that
is, the eigenvector corresponding to λmin. Accordingly, S0 = (−
√
P0+t)
νmin
‖νmin‖ and S1 = (−
√
P0+d
∗+t) νmin‖νmin‖ for t ∈
[0,
√
P1+
√
P0−d∗] are possible optimal signal pairs. Similarly, S0 = (
√
P0− t) νmin‖νmin‖ and S1 = (
√
P0−d∗− t) νmin‖νmin‖
for t ∈ [0,√P1+
√
P0−d∗] consist of another set of possible optimal signal pairs. Note that it may be possible to find
optimal signal pairs {S0,S1} ∈ S that satisfy (S1−S0)TΣ−1(S1−S0) =
∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣ in any other direction rather
than the direction of νmin; however, finding a single pair that corresponds to an equilibrium would be sufficient.
5.3 Nash Game Analysis
Theorem 5.3. Theorem 4.1 also holds for the vector case.
Proof. Let the transmitter choose any signals S = {S0,S1}. Assuming nonzero priors πt0, πr0 , πt1 and πr1 , the optimal
decision rule for the receiver is given by (18). Similar to the team case analysis in Section 5.1, the equilibrium is
non-informative if τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞; thus, 0 < τ <∞ can be assumed.
Now assume that the receiver applies a single-threshold rule; i.e., δ :
{
aTy
H1
R
H0
η where a ∈ Rn and η ∈ R.
Remark 5.1. Note that for a = 0, the receiver chooses either always H0 or always H1 without considering the
value of y, which implies a non-informative equilibrium. Therefore, S∗0 = S
∗
1, a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1) (i.e., the
decision rule of the receiver is δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ) constitute a non-informative equilibrium regardless of the values of the
priors and costs of the players.
Thus, due to the remark above, it can be assumed that a 6= 0 holds. Since aTY ∼ N
(
aTSi, a
TΣa
)
under Hi
for i ∈ {0, 1}, the conditional probabilities are P10 = Q
(
η−aTS0√
aTΣa
)
and P01 = Q
(
− η−aTS1√
aTΣa
)
. Then, the Bayes risk
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of the transmitter becomes
rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00 + πt1Ct11 + πt0(Ct10 − Ct00)Q
(
η − aTS0√
aTΣa
)
+ πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q
(
−η − a
TS1√
aTΣa
)
.
Since the power constraints are ‖S0‖2 ≤ P0 and ‖S1‖2 ≤ P1, the signals S0 and S1 can be regarded as independent.
Since Q function is a monotone decreasing, the following cases hold for i ∈ {0, 1}:
1. Ct1i < C
t
0i ⇒ Then, rt(S, δ) is a decreasing function of aTSi, thus the transmitter always chooses aTSi as
maximum subject to ‖Si‖2 ≤ Pi; i.e., Si =
√
Pi
a
‖a‖ .
2. Ct1i = C
t
0i ⇒ Then Si has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter.
3. Ct1i > C
t
0i ⇒ Then, rt(S, δ) is an increasing function of aTSi, thus the transmitter always chooses aTSi as
minimum subject to ‖Si‖2 ≤ Pi; i.e., Si = −
√
Pi
a
‖a‖ .
Thus, the the optimal signals can be characterized as S0 = −sgn(Ct10−Ct00)
√
P0
a
‖a‖ and S1 = sgn(C
t
01−Ct11)
√
P1
a
‖a‖ .
By using the expressions above, the cases can be listed as follows:
1. τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞ ⇒ The equilibrium is non-informative.
2. Ct10 = C
t
00 (and/or C
t
01 = C
t
11) ⇒ S0 (and/or S1) has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter, thus it
can arbitrarily be chosen by the transmitter. In this case, if the transmitter chooses S0 = S1; i.e., he does
not send anything useful to the receiver, and the receiver applies the decision rule δ : ζ
H1
R
H0
ζτ ; i.e., he only
considers the prior information (totally discards the information sent by the transmitter). Then there exists
a non-informative equilibrium.
3. Notice that, since 0 < τ <∞ is assumed, ζ = sgn(Cr01−Cr11) = sgn(Cr10−Cr00) is obtained. Now, assume that
the decision rule of the receiver is δ :
{
aTy
H1
R
H0
η. Then, the transmitter selects S0 = −sgn(Ct10−Ct00)
√
P0
a
‖a‖
and S1 = sgn(C
t
01 − Ct11)
√
P1
a
‖a‖ as optimal signals, and the decision rule becomes (18). By combining the
best responses of the transmitter and the receiver,
aT = ζ(S1 − S0)TΣ−1 = ζ a
T
‖a‖
(
sgn(Ct01 − Ct11)
√
P1 + sgn(C
t
10 − Ct00)
√
P0
)
Σ−1
⇒aTa = a
TΣ−1a
‖a‖ ζ
(
sgn(Ct01 − Ct11)
√
P1 + sgn(C
t
10 − Ct00)
√
P0
)
⇒ sgn(C
t
01 − Ct11)
sgn(Cr01 − Cr11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ1)
√
P1 +
sgn(Ct10 − Ct00)
sgn(Cr10 − Cr00)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ0)
√
P0 > 0 (20)
Notice that the expressions in (20) and (17) of Theorem 4.1 are the same, and Remark 4.1 and Remark 5.1
are equivalent; hence, the Nash equilibrium solution of Theorem 4.1 also holds for the vector case.
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6 EXTENSION TO a SCENARIO with an AVERAGE POWER
CONSTRAINT
Besides the peak power constraint considered in the previous sections, the average power constraint can be assumed
at the transmitter side. Before presenting the technical results, we provide the following lemma which will be
utilized in the equilibrium analyses of the team and Stackelberg setups.
Lemma 6.1. The optimal solutions to the optimization problem
sup
S0,S1
(S1 − S0)2 s.t. β0S20 + β1S21 ≤ P, β0, β1 ∈ R>0 (21)
are (S∗0 , S
∗
1) =
(
−
√
β1
β0(β0+β1)
P,
√
β0
β1(β0+β1)
P
)
and (S∗0 , S
∗
1) =
(√
β1
β0(β0+β1)
P ,−
√
β0
β1(β0+β1)
P
)
.
Proof. Observe the following inequalities:
β0β1(S1 − S0)2 = β0β1
(
S21 − 2S1S0 + S20
) (a)≤ β0β1 (S21 + 2|S1||S0|+ S20)
= β0β1
(
S21 + S
2
0
)
+ 2|β0S0||β1S1|
(b)
≤ β0β1
(
S21 + S
2
0
)
+ β20S
2
0 + β
2
1S
2
1
= β0
(
β0S
2
0 + β1S
2
1
)
+ β1
(
β0S
2
0 + β1S
2
1
) (c)≤ (β0 + β1)P . (22)
Here, (b) follows from the inequality for the arithmetic and geometric mean, and the equality holds iff β21S
2
1 =
β20S
2
0 . For (a), the equality holds iff S1S0 ≤ 0; and for (c), the equality holds iff β0S20 + β1S21 = P . Thus, the
upper bound of (S1 − S0)2 can be achieved with optimal solutions (S∗0 , S∗1 ) =
(
−
√
β1
β0(β0+β1)
P ,
√
β0
β1(β0+β1)
P
)
or
(S∗0 , S
∗
1) =
(√
β1
β0(β0+β1)
P ,−
√
β0
β1(β0+β1)
P
)
so that (S∗1 − S∗0)2 = β0+β1β0β1 P .
Consider a transmitter with an average power constraint; i.e., the transmitter performs the optimal signal design
problem under the power constraint below:
S , {S = {S0, S1} : πt0|S0|2 + πt1|S1|2 ≤ Pavg} ,
where Pavg denotes the average power limit.
6.0.1 Team Theoretic Analysis
In order to minimize the Bayes risk, the transmitter always prefers the maximum d = |S1−S0|
σ
. Thus, by
Lemma 6.1, the optimal signal levels are chosen as either (S∗0 , S
∗
1 ) =
(
−
√
πt1
πt0(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg,
√
πt0
πt1(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg
)
or
(S∗0 , S
∗
1) =
(√
πt1
πt0(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg,−
√
πt0
πt1(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg
)
. The corresponding optimal decision rule of the receiver is chosen
based on the rule in (10) accordingly. Actually, the equilibrium points are essentially unique; i.e., they result in the
same Bayes risks for the transmitter and the receiver.
6.0.2 Stackelberg Game Analysis
Similar to the team setup analysis, for every possible case in Table 2, there are more than one equilibrium
points, and they are essentially unique since the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver depend on d.
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For example, for d∗ = dmax ,
√
pit
0
+pit
1
pit
0
pit
1
Pavg
σ
, (S∗0 , S
∗
1) =
(
−
√
πt1
πt0(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg,
√
πt0
πt1(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg
)
and (S∗0 , S
∗
1 ) =(√
πt1
πt0(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg,−
√
πt0
πt1(π
t
0+π
t
1)
Pavg
)
are the only possible choices for the transmitter, and the decision rule of
the receiver is chosen based on the rule in (10). However, for d∗ = 0, there are infinitely many choices for the
transmitter and the receiver, and all of them are essentially unique; i.e., they result in the same Bayes risks for
the transmitter and the receiver. A similar argument holds for d∗ =
√∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1) ∣∣∣; i.e., there are infinitely many
choices for the transmitter and the receiver, and all of them are essentially unique.
6.0.3 Nash Game Analysis
For 0 < τ < ∞, if the receiver applies a single-threshold rule; i.e., δ :
{
ay
H1
R
H0
η where a ∈ R − {0}5, and η ∈ R,
after analyzing derivative of the Bayes risk of the transmitter in (16) with respect to the signals, the following can
be obtained:
1. Ct1i = C
t
0i ⇒ Si has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter.
2. Ct1i < C
t
0i or C
t
1i > C
t
0i ⇒ rt(S, δ) is a decreasing (increasing) function of Si if a(Ct1i −Ct0i) is negative (posi-
tive); thus the transmitter chooses the optimal signal level Si as large as possible in absolute value. Therefore,
the transmitter prefers to utilize the maximum possible total power; i.e., the power constraint can be consid-
ered as πt1S
2
1 + π
t
0S
2
0 = Pavg rather than π
t
1S
2
1 + π
t
0S
2
0 ≤ Pavg.
By using the analysis above, the cases can be listed as follows:
1. Ct1i = C
t
0i ⇒ If Ct1j = Ct0j also holds for j 6= i, then neither S0 nor S1 changes the Bayes risk of the transmitter;
thus, there exists a non-informative equilibrium. Otherwise; i.e., Ct1j 6= Ct0j for j 6= i, the transmitter chooses
the optimal signal levels as Si = 0 and Sj = −sgn
(
a(Ct1j − Ct0j)
)√Pavg
πt
j
, and the equilibrium is informative.
2. Ct10 6= Ct00 and Ct11 6= Ct01 ⇒ Since the transmitter adjust the signal levels such that πt1S21 + πt0S20 = P , the
optimal signals must be in the form of S0 = −sgn
(
a(Ct10 − Ct00)
)
x and S1 = sgn
(
a(Ct01 − Ct11)
)√Pavg−πt0x2
πt1
for x ∈
[
0,
√
Pavg
πt0
]
. Then, the Bayes risk of the transmitter in (16) can be expressed as
rt(S, δ) = πt0Ct00 + πt1Ct11 + πt0(Ct10 − Ct00)Q
(
η + |a|sgn (Ct10 − Ct00)x
|a|σ
)
+ πt1(C
t
01 − Ct11)Q

−η − |a|sgn (Ct01 − Ct11)
√
Pavg−πt0x2
πt1
|a|σ

 . (23)
Note that the convexity of rt(S, δ) in (23) with respect to x changes depending on the other parameters (i.e.,
priors, costs and the receiver policy); hence, the optimal x cannot be expressed in a closed form. Let x∗ be an
optimal solution to (23); i.e., x∗ = argmin
x∈
[
0,
√
Pavg
pit
0
] rt(S, δ), which implies that the optimal signal levels are
5Due to Remark 4.1, S∗0 = S
∗
1 , a
∗ = 0, and η∗ = ζ(τ − 1) always constitute a non-informative equilibrium regardless of the values
of the priors and costs of the players
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S0 = −sgn
(
a(Ct10 − Ct00)
)
x∗ and S1 = sgn
(
a(Ct01 − Ct11)
)√Pavg−πt0(x∗)2
πt1
. Then, similar to (17), the following
condition on the existence of an equilibrium can be obtained:
sgn(Ct01 − Ct11)
sgn(Cr01 − Cr11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ1)
√
Pavg − πt0(x∗)2
πt1
+
sgn(Ct10 − Ct00)
sgn(Cr10 − Cr00)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sgn(ξ0)
x∗ > 0 . (24)
Here, similar to the analysis under the individual power constraint in Theorem 4.1, unless (24) is satisfied,
the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver cannot match each other. In particular,
(a) ξ0 < 0 and ξ1 < 0 ⇒ There does not exist a Nash equilibrium for a 6= 0; however, due to Remark 4.1,
for a = 0, there always exist non-informative equilibria.
(b) ξ0 < 0 and ξ1 > 0 ⇒ If
√
Pavg−πt0(x∗)2
πt1
> x∗ ⇒ x∗ < √Pavg, then the Nash equilibrium is informative.
If x∗ =
√
Pavg, there exists a non-informative equilibrium. Otherwise; i.e., if x
∗ >
√
Pavg, there does
not exist a Nash equilibrium for a 6= 0; however, due to Remark 4.1, for a = 0, there always exist
non-informative equilibria.
(c) ξ0 > 0 and ξ1 < 0⇒ If x∗ >
√
Pavg, then the Nash equilibrium is informative. If x
∗ =
√
Pavg, there exists
a non-informative equilibrium. Otherwise; i.e., if x∗ <
√
Pavg, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium
for a 6= 0; however, due to Remark 4.1, for a = 0, there always exist non-informative equilibria.
(d) ξ0 > 0 and ξ1 > 0 ⇒ There exists an informative Nash equilibrium.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the
receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of
the transmitter to his policies, we formulated the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash
or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and established equilibrium solutions and their properties.
We showed that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the
Stackelberg and Nash assumptions, and derived the conditions under which an informative equilibrium exists. We
also studied the effects of small perturbations around the team setup (with identical priors and costs) and showed
that the game equilibrium behavior around the team setup is robust under the Nash assumption, whereas it is not
robust under the Stackelberg assumption.
The binary setup considered here can be extended to the M -ary hypothesis testing setup, and the corresponding
signaling game structure can be formed in order to model a game between players with a multiple-bit communi-
cation channel. The extension to more general noise distributions is possible: the Nash equilibrium analysis holds
identically when the noise distribution leads to a single-threshold test. Finally, in addition to the Bayesian ap-
proach considered here, different cost structures and parameters can be introduced by investigating the game under
Neyman-Pearson and mini-max criteria.
References
[1] S. Sarıtas¸, S. Gezici, and S. Yu¨ksel, “Binary signaling under subjective priors and costs as a game,” in 57th
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Dec. 2018, pp. 1130–1135.
24
[2] H. Sandberg, S. S. Amin, and K. H. Johansson, “Cyberphysical security in networked control systems: An
introduction to the issue,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 20–23, 2015.
[3] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “A secure control framework for resource-limited
adversaries,” Automatica, vol. 51, pp. 135–148, 2015.
[4] T. Alpcan and T. Bas¸ar, Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach, 1st ed. New York,
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[5] Y. Mo, T.-H. Kim, K. Brancik, D. Dickinson, H. Lee, A. Perrig, and B. Sinopoli, “Cyber physical security of
a smart grid infrastructure,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195–209, Jan. 2012.
[6] G. Dan and H. Sandberg, “Stealth attacks and protection schemes for state estimators in power systems,” in
First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010, pp. 214–219.
[7] A. S. Rawat, P. Anand, H. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “Collaborative spectrum sensing in the presence of
Byzantine attacks in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 2, pp.
774–786, Feb. 2011.
[8] W. Hashlamoun, S. Brahma, and P. K. Varshney, “Mitigation of Byzantine attacks on distributed detection
systems using audit bits,” IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks, vol. 4,
no. 1, pp. 18–32, Mar. 2018.
[9] B. Tondi, N. Merhav, and M. Barni, “Detection games under fully active adversaries,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.02850, 2018.
[10] V. S. S. Nadendla, V. Sharma, and P. K. Varshney, “On strategic multi-antenna jamming in centralized
detection networks,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 186–190, Feb. 2017.
[11] A. Gupta, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “Optimal control in the presence of an intelligent jammer with limited
actions,” in 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2010, pp. 1096–1101.
[12] A. Gupta, A. Nayyar, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “A dynamic transmitter-jammer game with asymmetric
information,” in 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2012, pp. 6477–6482.
[13] T. Bas¸ar and Y.-W. Wu, “A complete characterization of minimax and maximin encoder-decoder policies for
communication channels with incomplete statistical description,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 482–489, 1985.
[14] H. V. Poor, An Introduction to Signal Detection and Estimation, 2nd ed. New York, NY, USA: Springer-Verlag,
1994.
[15] S. M. Kay, Fundamentals of Statistical Signal Processing, Volume II: Detection Theory. Prentice-Hall, 1993.
[16] T. Bas¸ar and G. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Philadelphia, PA: SIAM Classics in Applied
Mathematics, 1999.
[17] V. Crawford and J. Sobel, “Strategic information transmission,” Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 1431–1451, 1982.
[18] C. D. Richmond and L. L. Horowitz, “Parameter bounds on estimation accuracy under model misspecification,”
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 63, no. 9, pp. 2263–2278, May 2015.
25
[19] R. M. Dufour and E. L. Miller, “Statistical estimation with 1/f-type prior models: robustness to mismatch and
efficient model determination,” in IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), vol. 5, May 1996, pp. 2491–2494.
[20] S. Fortunati, F. Gini, M. S. Greco, and C. D. Richmond, “Performance bounds for parameter estimation under
misspecified models: Fundamental findings and applications,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 34, no. 6,
pp. 142–157, Nov. 2017.
[21] T. Bas¸ar, “An equilibrium theory for multiperson decision making with multiple probabilistic models,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 118–132, Feb. 1985.
[22] D. Teneketzis and P. Varaiya, “Consensus in distributed estimation,” in Advances in Statistical Signal Process-
ing, H. V. Poor, Ed. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988, ch. 10, pp. 361–386.
[23] D. A. Castanon and D. Teneketzis, “Further results on the asymptotic agreement problem,” IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 515–523, June 1988.
[24] S. Yu¨ksel and T. Bas¸ar, Stochastic Networked Control Systems: Stabilization and Optimization under Infor-
mation Constraints. Boston, MA: Birkha¨user, 2013.
[25] S. Sarıtas¸, S. Yu¨ksel, and S. Gezici, “Quadratic multi-dimensional signaling games and affine equilibria,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 605–619, Feb. 2017.
[26] M. O. Sayın, E. Akyol, and T. Bas¸ar, “Hierarchical multi-stage Gaussian signaling games: Strategic commu-
nication and control,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.09448, 2017.
[27] G. Brown, M. Carlyle, J. Salmern, and K. Wood, “Defending critical infrastructure,” Interfaces, vol. 36, no. 6,
pp. 530–544, 2006.
[28] D. Korzhyk, Z. Yin, C. Kiekintveld, V. Conitzer, and M. Tambe, “Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: An
extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness,” Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 297–327, May 2011.
[29] S. Sarıtas¸, S. Yu¨ksel, and S. Gezici, “Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stack-
elberg equilibria,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.03816, 2019.
[30] F. Farokhi, A. Teixeira, and C. Langbort, “Estimation with strategic sensors,” IEEE Transactions on Auto-
matic Control, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 724–739, Feb. 2017.
[31] M. Barni and B. Tondi, “The source identification game: An information-theoretic perspective,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 450–463, Mar. 2013.
[32] R. Avenhaus, B. von Stengel, and S. Zamir, “Inspection games,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic
Applications, 1st ed., R. Aumann and S. Hart, Eds. Elsevier, 2002, vol. 3, ch. 51, pp. 1947–1987.
[33] R. Avenhaus, “Decision theoretic analysis of pollutant emission monitoring procedures,” Annals of Operations
Research, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 23–38, Dec. 1994.
[34] ——, “Monitoring the emission of pollutants by means of the inspector leadership method,” in Conflicts and
Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources, R. Pethig, Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992, pp.
241–273.
26
[35] T. Zhang and Q. Zhu, “Hypothesis testing game for cyber deception,” in Decision and Game Theory for
Security, L. Bushnell, R. Poovendran, and T. Bas¸ar, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018,
pp. 540–555.
[36] M. Azizoglu, “Convexity properties in binary detection problems,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 1316–1321, July 1996.
27
